Context
1979 proved a difficult year for the Carter administration. In mid-January, the longtime US ally the shah of Iran departed Tehran amid violent protests and revolution. Two weeks later the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to head a new Islamic Republic. Along with the loss of important military and intelligence facilities, the Iranian Revolution resulted in the collapse of the longstanding US strategy that had tasked Iran and Saudi Arabia with upholding regional stability. Furthermore, American policymakers feared the ensuing political chaos opened the country up to potential Soviet infiltration. The situation deteriorated further in November when Islamic militants stormed the US embassy in Tehran and seized more than fifty Americans, who were held hostage for the next 444 days. Just over a month later Moscow began airlifting troops into neighboring Afghanistan to bolster a faltering communist regime. On December 27, Soviet special forces assassinated Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and installed a puppet government under Babrak Karmal. The twin shocks of Iran and Afghanistan, along with the growing Soviet influence in Ethiopia and Yemen, seemed to demonstrate the inexorable decline of American power in Southwest Asia. It also underlined the ineffectiveness of the Carter administration in countering Soviet advances, which resulted in aggressive criticism of Carter’s apparent weakness in dealing with Moscow.
Significance
Carter’s 32-minute speech heralded a dramatic shift in foreign policy direction, away from the idealistic promotion of human rights and cooperation with Moscow towards a more traditional policy of containment. Alarmist in tone, Carter outlined the implications of the Soviet invasion as posing “a more serious threat to the peace since the Second World War” as it potentially affected “the free movement of Middle East oil” on which the West relied. Carter adopted a more hawkish position by embracing the viewpoint that to fail to stand up sufficiently to Moscow’s aggressive expansionism would only invite future problems. He chose his annual address to publicly and clearly “draw the line,” modeling the speech on the Truman Doctrine. The policy shift represented a victory for hardliners (particularly National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) over others that favored cooperation over confrontation (such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance). The choice of the nationally televised speech as a means of delivery underscored the importance Carter attached to the issue, while also serving as an unambiguous public warning to Moscow.