Significant issues with disaster preparedness at all levels
When Nagin declared a mandatory evacuation on the Sunday morning of August 28, 2005, there wasn't enough time to evacuate everyone. The city lacked the necessary resources to provide transportation for those without a vehicle.
In a previous interview with FRONTLINE, Michael Brown, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director at the time, shared that by Saturday, he "at least wanted a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes."
The storm's aftermath exposed deep flaws in the country's disaster preparedness and response systems, while also highlighting issues of race, class, and inequality. Approximately 200,000 residents, including the elderly and impoverished, did not evacuate.
According to a national poll conducted by Pew Research Center a week after the storm, Black New Orleanians were highly critical of the federal government's relief efforts. In the poll, 66 percent of Black respondents believed that "the government's response to the situation would have been faster if most of the victims had been white."
While appearing on Countdown with Keith Olbermann, Rev. Al Sharpton shared the same sentiments as Black New Orleanians. "I feel that, if it was in another area, with another economic strata and racial makeup, that President Bush would have run out of Crawford a lot quicker and FEMA would have found its way in a lot sooner," he said.
The Lower 9th Ward, a historically Black, low-income neighborhood situated near the levees, was profoundly impacted by Katrina due to its vulnerable location and limited resources.
The response to Hurricane Katrina was widely criticized for being slow and ineffective, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
Many people were left stranded without food, water, or medical care for days after the hurricane hit, and the federal, state, and local governments were widely criticized for their lack of coordination and preparation.
"We were abandoned," Patricia Thompson, a New Orleans evacuee, told the Select Committee Hearing panel investigating the response to the storm in 2005. "City officials did nothing to protect us. We were told to go to the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the Interstate Bridge for safety. We did this more than once. In fact, we tried them all every day for over a week."