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History Warns Us About Cabinet Members Like RFK Jr.

If RFK is confirmed, he is likely to fail for reasons similar to those for past political choices for the cabinet.

But Lincoln owed him. At the 1860 Republican convention, Pennsylvania voted for Cameron on the first ballot, helping thwart Seward’s effort to roll up the nomination early. Cameron then threw Pennsylvania’s support to Lincoln, one of the decisive steps in getting Lincoln the nomination. Lincoln had formally told David Davis, his campaign manager, not to promise anyone office, but made private pledges to Cameron that were universally understood at the time to ensure Cameron a spot to place in the cabinet, most likely for himself. Because he would have to resign from the Senate to take an executive branch post, it would need to be a good position. It was widely assumed to mean secretary of the treasury.

In the general election, Pennsylvania was the nation’s second-largest state, casting 27 of the nation’s 303 electoral votes (the equivalent of 48 electoral votes today). It voted Democrat in 1856, 1852, 1844, 1836, 1832, and 1828. In 1856, Pennsylvanian James Buchanan carried just over 50 percent of the vote in the state, but the opposition was divided 32 percent for the Republican and 18 percent for the Know-Nothing candidate. Cameron’s support in the general election, including his assurances that Lincoln was a sound supporter of the protective tariffs popular (then as now) with Pennsylvanians, helped Lincoln take 56 percent of the vote in the Keystone State.

Lincoln hemmed and hawed on what to do with Cameron almost until his own inauguration in March, in part because Cameron wanted to be treasury secretary and Lincoln didn’t trust him handling the nation’s finances. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania pushed for Chase rather than Cameron in that job. Lincoln should have known better, with seven southern states already seceded and the crisis at Fort Sumter mounting, than to think he could get away with stashing a shaky choice atop the War Department, of all places. But the logic of coalition politics prevailed. The day after Lincoln’s inauguration, the Senate waved through the confirmation of Cameron, Seward, Chase, and most of the cabinet without objection (let alone hearings, which were unknown at the time).

Predictably enough, Cameron was a fiasco in office. He lasted less than a year. He didn’t tell Lincoln before he used war powers to shutter the Baltimore newspapers. He got out in front of Lincoln on emancipating and enlisting slaves, releasing his statements in an annual report that also went to the papers without first being cleared with Lincoln. Meanwhile, after taking over the telegraph system, he authorized the military to withhold access from the president. Lincoln ended up asking Seward and the State Department to handle counterintelligence functions he didn’t dare entrust to Cameron. He even asked Chase’s opinion on war matters rather than ask Cameron.