The 40-year neoliberal looting of the United States’ physical and social infrastructure guaranteed that any response to Katrina would be slow, militarized, and unequal. Thousands of my neighbors either perished in a horrible instant or languished slowly because of neglect. Had we not convinced my mom to leave, she too would have died, entombed in her own home. For the corporate owners of America’s private dredging fleet, this would have been an acceptable price to pay.
Since the 1970s, the private dredging industry has fought a relentless war to eliminate competition from the public sector. Between 1899 and 1949, the Corps built 150 dredges which were used to develop waterways and ports. But when it came time to replace these aging vessels in the mid-1960s, private businesses saw an opportunity to seize those lucrative contracts for themselves. In 1972, they successfully lobbied Congress into imposing a multi-year dredge moratorium, which intentionally held funds for replacement of public dredges hostage until a “National Dredging Study” on privatizing the fleet could be completed.
Meanwhile, private organizations like Chicago’s Great Lakes Dredge & Dock and the National Association of Dredging Contractors were busy testifying in several Congressional appropriations committee hearings. They argued that before the government even considered building its own new fleet of dredge vessels, it should first consult industry. Surely the free market would be able to provide a more cost-effective solution.
In 1976, a Senate subcommittee held a hearing on proposed legislation to privatize the public dredge fleet. Critics of the move were incredulous, as a private consultancy’s study on privatizing the fleet forecasted that American taxpayers would spend between 20-26 percent more for private industry to do all of the necessary work compared with a publicly-owned fleet. Still, defenders of privatization were dismissive of these findings, evoking now-familiar rhetoric on smaller government and a near-religious faith that private industry competition will keep costs down. When the Corps and industry were grilled on these forecasts, their answers were evasive. Representatives for the Corps explained that they “expect[ed] that the extensive competition which has been available in the past will continue to be available, which should keep the contract bids within a reasonable range.” No evidence was presented to support this claim. It turned out that none was needed. Congress passed the Minimum Fleet Legislation Public Law 95-269 on April 26, 1978. The new policy directed the Corps to utilize its own fleet only when a private bid exceeded the government bid by 25 percent.