But what about the citizenship status of the enslaved? The exception clause in the 13th Amendment clearly provides for citizenship with slavery: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” The Amendment abolished slavery, but still allows the State to subject convicted felons to slavery. Indeed, slave status of convicted persons was attested explicitly in Virginia’s Supreme Court case of Ruffin v. Commonwealth (1871). The ruling in this case is as follows, a prisoner “has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the state.” Once a citizen, always a citizen, unless by de jure or de factopersonal renunciation. These include personal declaration, conviction of treason, running for public office, or voting in a foreign country without dual citizenship.
The 13th Amendment demonstrates that a person can simultaneously be a citizen and a slave—forced into involuntary servitude via conviction and incarceration. So, what was the status of those held in chattel slavery in the United States, particularly those who were native-born on this soil? Were they technically citizens, meaning members of the body politic, as described in the Constitution? Did they have or owe allegiance, whether by force or by choice, to the United States of America? Does citizenship necessarily depend upon the possession of an array of rights, privileges and immunities?
An intriguing answer can be found in the observations of Representative John A. Bingham (R-Ohio) who served in Congress from 1855 to 1863 and 1865 to 1873. Recall when Justice Taney suggested that members of the “African race, whether slave or free, owed allegiance to the Government,” he touched on a crucial dimension of citizenship, loyalty and fidelity.
Taney’s majority opinion, contradictorily, converged the denial of black citizenship with the insistence of black allegiance—even for enslaved people. Presumably, for Taney, this form of loyalty meant the enslaved would not engage in armed resistance against the slaveholders. However, the contradiction was rendered moot by the Confederate secession, which enabled enslaved people to display their allegiance by pursuing their own emancipation by joining the Union’s armed forces.