“Anyone who has opposed the policy of the moment has been labeled as an obstructionist and an isolationist.” This wry observation was made by “Mr. Republican,” Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft. Taft’s comments were delivered in reference to his opposition to the Marshall Plan, the post-
World War II recovery proposal which aimed to restore European economies, promote liberal commercial integration, and thwart communism’s spread in Europe. Taft led a body of conservative Republicans, who coupled with progressives to oppose this and other components of the Cold War. They believed that the suite of diplomatic policy changes would eliminate America’s economic advantage, benefit certain exporters, violate U.S. sovereignty, guarantee confrontation with the Soviet Union, and transform the United States from a republic into an empire. For their trouble, this transpartisan band of troublemakers were accused of advocating for appeasement and isolationism.
For over 80 years, the word “isolationist” has been used by the U.S. foreign policy establishment to narrow the range of acceptable public opinion on America’s role in the world. Popularized during America’s rise as an international superpower, the label has been used since 1945 to control dissent and limit the window of public discourse on foreign policy matters. As the United States enters another round of agonizing soul searching after another lost war, Americans should learn this word’s fraught political history.
“Isolationist” began its career as a strawman prior to American entry into World War II. The myth of an isolated America was created by foreign policy elites as a rhetorical foil for its own desire for U.S. dominance in the postwar world. “Isolationist” became a pejorative shorthand for narrowminded Americans who desired economic autarky and political neutrality from the outside world. The label was liberally applied to opponents of U.S. entry into World War II (left and right), none of whom would have used it themselves, and many of whom would have been considered internationalists a few years prior. Additionally, the burgeoning U.S. foreign policy establishment used the myth of isolationism to blame the rise fascism upon a benighted America which sought to politically disentangle itself from Europe after the Great War. “Isolationism” became the twin of another rhetorical hammer: appeasement. Together they would be used to shape a triumphant, “good war” narrative of World War II, one which would be mobilized to serve an American-dominated postwar order.